
viernes, 3 de octubre de 2008
Un Ramo de Flores

Visión Política de Solidaridad
Ante la crisis política que vive el país, hoy mas que nunca urge consolidar para los puestos de representación popular, un tren de auténticos lideres dirigentes que posean arraigo ante el ciudadano común así como la capacidad organizativa para poder llevar adelante un verdadero espíritu de lucha desde y con los ciudadanos en los próximos escenarios en defensa de la legalidad y nuestro estilo de vida. Vemos con estupor, como son asesinados diariamente un número cada vez más aterrador de ciudadanos venezolanos sin que haya respuesta de quienes detenta el poder metropolitano y nacional, haciendo de las estadísticas, simples cómplices de un proyecto político que por omisión permite semejante mortandad, con el propósito deliberado de conmocionar al país. Estamos convencidos que la lucha será sin tregua, sabemos que mientras haya un gobierno con intensiones manifiestamente totalitarias, no habrá modo de detener la inseguridad pública, pues este gobierno se soporta del terror ciudadano para implementar en forma arbitraria decretos que pisotean la constitución y las leyes vigentes, pero además, al total margen de la ley, proscribe nuestro muy preciado estilo de vida democrático para imponer un sistemas de creencias que atentan contra la individualidad de hombre, cercenando así, el bien mas primordial de una sociedad libre: la capacidad de pensar, discernir, de escoger y sobre todo de rebelarse ante los hechos contra natura.Es hora de imponer un nuevo estilo de dirigir el país, que sea una réplica desde las organizaciones vecinales con sus representantes genuinos en los cabildos, asambleas, alcaldías y gobernaciones, así como también en el alto gobierno. Para ello es menester iniciar una nueva etapa de liderazgo político y en ello Solidaridad plantea una nueva propuesta, basada en la orquestación de nuevos actores en el ruedo público que además de redimensionar el estilo de relacionarse con y entre los ciudadanos, incorporen también nuevas formas de organización y organicidad, acentuadamente horizontales. Mientras el gobierno pretende centralizar más y más el poder de decisión, haciendo de los "Consejos Comunales" simples herramientas de control absoluto de la sociedad, Solidaridad plantea muy al contrario imponer un estilo federativo dentro y fuera de las organizaciones civiles; propugnando con ello la exaltación del genuino accionar democrático y cimentando a la vez contundentes diques que frenen el ímpetu absolutista del régimen. Nuestra efectiva incorporación al Cabildo Metropolitano, no solo contribuirá con la introducción de novedosas ordenanzas que racionalicen el efectivo servicio de una prestación tan primordial como lo es el transporte público, sino que haciendo de este una emblemática cualidad de: CÓMODO, LIMPIO Y SEGURO, también permitirá desde esa tribuna, la efectiva activación de la estructura orgánica mas activa y de mayor alcance de acción urbana que pueda tener alguna sociedad civil. Es hora que el usuario y el conductor, sean una llave apostando al mismo propósito, pues, mientras el gobierno nacional dictamina estrategias para permanecer en el poder, usuarios y conductores debemos establecer maniobras conjuntas que protejan a los ciudadanos, del robo a mano armada, del asesinato de conductores y usuarios, inclusive, mediante la creación de cooperativas conjuntas, que puedan proveer tanto a usuarios como a profesionales del transporte, no solo acceso a repuestos automotores mas económicos, sino también de productos de la cesta básica, apostando al valor oportunidad del dinero efectivo. El poder central mediante su accionar ha procurado la división de la sociedad civil entre ricos y pobres, negros y blancos, empresarios y asalariados; nosotros por el contrario, estamos convencidos de que mediante la justa cooperación entre quienes independientemente de donde trabajemos o provengamos, haremos de nuestra ciudad capital y al largo plazo del país, un verdadero crisol de ciudadanos comprometidos con el respecto al prójimo, conciencia colectiva fundamental para una sociedad perfectiblemente urbana y manifestación verdadera del sentimiento solidario cristiano.Vota Lista al Cabildo Metropolitano.1. José Luís Montoya
2.-Domingo Martínez
Hagamos de los transportistas, una llave y con ello un instrumento de cambio y defensa de nuestras libertades....
Normas de Seguridad al colocar gasolina
jueves, 2 de octubre de 2008
Lluvia

algo de soñolencia resignada y amable,
una música humilde se despierta con ella
que hace vibrar el alma dormida del paisaje.
Es un besar azul que recibe la Tierra,
el mito primitivo que vuelve a realizarse.
El contacto ya frío de cielo y tierra viejos
con una mansedumbre de atardecer constante.
Es la aurora del fruto. La que nos trae las flores
y nos unge de espíritu santo de los mares.
La que derrama vida sobre las sementeras
y en el alma tristeza de lo que no se sabe.
La nostalgia terrible de una vida perdida,
el fatal sentimiento de haber nacido tarde,
o la ilusión inquieta de un mañana imposible
con la inquietud cercana del color de la carne.
El amor se despierta en el gris de su ritmo,
nuestro cielo interior tiene un triunfo de sangre,
pero nuestro optimismo se convierte en tristeza
al contemplar las gotas muertas en los cristales.
Y son las gotas: ojos de infinito que miran
al infinito blanco que les sirvió de madre.
Cada gota de lluvia tiembla en el cristal turbio
y le dejan divinas heridas de diamante.
Son poetas del agua que han visto y que meditan
lo que la muchedumbre de los ríos no sabe.
¡Oh lluvia silenciosa, sin tormentas ni vientos,
lluvia mansa y serena de esquila y luz suave,
lluvia buena y pacifica que eres la verdadera,
la que llorosa y triste sobre las cosas caes!
¡Oh lluvia franciscana que llevas a tus gotas
almas de fuentes claras y humildes manantiales!
Cuando sobre los campos desciendes lentamente
las rosas de mi pecho con tus sonidos abres.
El canto primitivo que dices al silencio
y la historia sonora que cuentas al ramaje
los comenta llorando mi corazón desierto
en un negro y profundo pentagrama sin clave.
Mi alma tiene tristeza de la lluvia serena,
tristeza resignada de cosa irrealizable,
tengo en el horizonte un lucero encendido
y el corazón me impide que corra a contemplarte.
¡Oh lluvia silenciosa que los árboles aman
y eres sobre el piano dulzura emocionante;
das al alma las mismas nieblas y resonancias
que pones en el alma dormida del paisaje!
Elegía a Doña Juana La Loca

Clavel rojo en un valle profundo y desolado.
La tumba que te guarda rezuma tu tristeza
a través de los ojos que ha abierto sobre el mármol.
Eras una paloma con alma gigantesca
cuyo nido fue sangre del suelo castellano,
derramaste tu fuego sobre un cáliz de nieve
y al querer alentarlo tus alas se troncharon.
Soñabas que tu amor fuera como el infante
que te sigue sumiso recogiendo tu manto.
Y en vez de flores, versos y collares de perlas,
te dio la Muerte rosas marchitas en un ramo.
Tenías en el pecho la formidable aurora de Isabel de Segura. Melibea.
Tu canto, como alondra que mira quebrarse el horizonte,
se torna de repente monótono y amargo.
Y tu grito estremece los cimientos de Burgos.
Y oprime la salmodia del coro cartujano.
Y choca con los ecos de las lentas campanas
perdiéndose en la sombra tembloroso y rasgado.
Tenías la pasión que da el cielo de España.
La pasión del puñal, de la ojera y el llanto.
¡Oh princesa divina de crepúsculo rojo,
con la rueca de hierro y de acero lo hilado!
Nunca tuviste el nido, ni el madrigal doliente,
ni el laúd juglaresco que solloza lejano.
Tu juglar fue un mancebo con escamas de plata
y un eco de trompeta su acento enamorado.
Y, sin embargo, estabas para el amor formada,
hecha para el suspiro, el mimo y el desmayo,
para llorar tristeza sobre el pecho querido
deshojando una rosa de olor entre los labios.
Para mirar la luna bordada sobre el río
y sentir la nostalgia que en sí lleva el rebaño
y mirar los eternos jardines de la sombra,
¡oh princesa morena que duermes bajo el mármol!
¿Tienes los ojos negros abiertos a la luz?
O se enredan serpientes a tus senos exhaustos...
¿Dónde fueron tus besos lanzados a los vientos?
¿Dónde fue la tristeza de tu amor desgraciado?
En el cofre de plomo, dentro de tu esqueleto,
tendrás el corazón partido en mil pedazos.
Y Granada te guarda como santa reliquia,
¡oh princesa morena que duermes bajo el mármol!
Eloisa y Julieta fueron dos margaritas,
pero tú fuiste un rojo clavel ensangrentado
que vino de la tierra dorada de Castilla
a dormir entre nieve y ciprerales castos.
Granada era tu lecho de muerte, Doña Juana,
los cipreses, tus cirios; la sierra, tu retablo.
Un retablo de nieve que mitigue tus ansias,
¡con el agua que pasa junto a ti! ¡La del Dauro!
Granada era tu lecho de muerte, Doña Juana,
la de las torres viejas y del jardín callado,
la de la yedra muerta sobre los muros rojos,
la de la niebla azul y el arrayán romántico.
Princesa enamorada y mal correspondida.
Clavel rojo en un valle profundo y desolado.
La tumba que te guarda rezuma tu tristeza
a través de los ojos que ha abierto sobre el mármol.
Don Federico García Lorca
Esta se la dedico a Magda Mascioli G. - J&A
Viejo, pero vigente
Un Luto adicional para el pueblo y para Gente del Petróleo

Frase del Día

Emilio Castelar y Ripoll
miércoles, 1 de octubre de 2008
Denuncias: José Iglesias rompe su silencio por última vez
Oda al reino de la hipocresía

Aprobada Ley de Ordenamiento Territorial

The Political Nature of the Economic Crisis

By: George Friedman - Classical economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo referred to their discipline as “political economy.” Smith’s great work, “The Wealth of Nations,” was written by the man who held the chair in moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow. This did not seem odd at the time and is not odd now. Economics is not a freestanding discipline, regardless of how it is regarded today. It is a discipline that can only be understood when linked to politics, since the wealth of a nation rests on both these foundations, and it can best be understood by someone who approaches it from a moral standpoint, since economics makes significant assumptions about both human nature and proper behavior. The modern penchant to regard economics as a discrete science parallels the belief that economics is a distinct sphere of existence — at its best when it is divorced from political and even moral considerations. Our view has always been that the economy can only be understood and forecast in the context of politics, and that the desire to separate the two derives from a moral teaching that Smith would not embrace. Smith understood that the word “economy” without the adjective “political” did not describe reality. We need to bear Smith in mind when we try to understand the current crisis. Societies have two sorts of financial crises. The first sort is so large it overwhelms a society’s ability to overcome it, and the society sinks deeper into dysfunction and poverty. In the second sort, the society has the resources to manage the situation — albeit at a collective price. Societies that can manage the crisis have two broad strategies. The first strategy is to allow the market to solve the problem over time. The second strategy is to have the state organize the resources of society to speed up the resolution. The market solution is more efficient over time, producing better outcomes and disciplining financial decision-making in the long run. But the market solution can create massive collateral damage, such as high unemployment, on the way to the superior resolution. The state-organized resolution creates inequities by not sufficiently punishing poor economic decisions, and creates long-term inefficiencies that are costly. But it has the virtue of being quicker and mitigating collateral damage. Three Views of the Financial Crisis - There is a first group that argues the current financial crisis already has outstripped available social resources, so that there is no market or state solution. This group asserts that the imbalances created in the financial markets are so vast that the market solution must consist of an extended period of depression. Any attempt by the state to appropriate social resources to solve the financial imbalance not only will be ineffective, it will prolong the crisis even further, although perhaps buying some minor alleviation up front. The thinking goes that the financial crisis has been building for years and the economy can no longer be protected from it, and that therefore an extended period of discipline and austerity — beginning with severe economic dislocations — is inevitable. This is not a majority view, but it is widespread; it opposes governmen t action on the grounds that the government will make a terrible situation worse. A second group argues that the financial crisis has not outstripped the ability of society — organized by the state — to manage, but that it has outstripped the market’s ability to manage it. The financial markets have been the problem, according to this view, and have created a massive liquidity crisis. The economy — as distinct from the financial markets — is relatively sound, but if the liquidity crisis is left unsolved, it will begin to affect the economy as a whole. Since the financial markets are unable to solve the problem in a time frame that will not dramatically affect the economy, the state must mobilize resources to impose a solution on the financial markets, introducing liquidity as the preface to any further solutions. This group believes, like the first group, that the financial crisis could have profound economic ramifications. But the second group also believes it is possible to contain the consequences. This is the view of th e Bush administration, the congressional leadership, the Federal Reserve Board and most economic leaders. There is a third group that argues that the state mobilization of resources to save the financial system is in fact an attempt to save financial institutions, including many of those whose imprudence and avarice caused the current crisis. This group divides in two. The first subgroup agrees the current financial crisis could have profound economic consequences, but believes a solution exists that would bring liquidity to the financial markets without rescuing the culpable. The second subgroup argues that the threat to the economic system is overblown, and that the financial crisis will correct itself without major state intervention but with some limited implementation of new regulations. The first group thus views the situation as beyond salvation, and certainly rejects any political solution as incapable of addressing the issues from the standpoint of magnitude or competence. This group is out of the political game by its own rules, since for it the situation is beyond the ability of politics to make a difference — except perhaps to make the situation worse. The second group represents the establishment consensus, which is that the markets cannot solve the problem but the federal government can — provided it acts quickly and decisively enough. The third group spoke Sept. 29, when a coalition of Democrats and Republicans defeated the establishment proposal. For a myriad of reasons, some contradictory, this group opposed the bailout. The reasons ranged from moral outrage at protecting the interests of the perpetrators of this crisis to distrust of a plan implemented by this presidential administration, from distrust of the amount of power ceded the Treasury Department of any administration to a feeling the problem could be managed. It was a diverse group that focused on one premise — namely, that delay would not lead to economic catastrophe.
From Economic to Political Problem - The problem ceased to be an economic problem months ago. More precisely, the economic problem has transformed into a political problem. Ever since the collapse of Bear Stearns, the primary actor in the drama has been the federal government and the Federal Reserve, with its powers increasing as the nature of potential market outcomes became more and more unsettling. At a certain point, the size of the problem outstripped the legislated resources of the Treasury and the Fed, so they went to Congress for more power and money. This time, they were blocked. It is useful to reflect on the nature of the crisis. It is a tale that can be as complicated as you wish to make it, but it is in essence simple and elegant. As interest rates declined in recent years, investors — particularly conservative ones — sought to increase their return without giving up safety and liquidity. They wanted something for nothing, and the market obliged. They were given instruments ultimately based on mortgages on private homes. They therefore had a very real asset base — a house — and therefore had collateral. The value of homes historically had risen, and therefore the value of the assets appeared secured. Financial instruments of increasing complexity eventually were devised, which were bought by conservative investors. In due course, these instruments were bought by less conservative investors, who used them as collateral for borrowing money. They used this money to buy other instruments in a pyramiding scheme that rested on one premise: the existence of houses whose value remained stable or grew. Unfortunately, housing prices declined. A period of uncertainty about the value of the paper based on home mortgages followed. People claimed to be confused as to what the real value of the paper was. In fact, they were not so much confused as deceptive. They didn’t want to reveal that the value of the paper had declined dramatically. At a certain point, the facts could no longer be hidden, and vast amounts of value evaporated — taking with them not only the vast pyramids of those who first created the instruments and then borrowed heavily against them, but also the more conservative investors trying to put their money in a secure space while squeezing out a few extra points of interest. The decline in housing prices triggered massive losses of money in the financial markets, as well as reluctance to lend based on uncertainty of values. The resu lt was a liquidity crisis, which simply meant that a lot of people had gone broke and that those who still had money weren’t lending it — certainly not to financial institutions. The S&L Precedent - Such financial meltdowns based on shifts in real estate prices are not new. In the 1970s, regulations on savings and loans (S&Ls) had changed. Previously, S&Ls had been limited to lending in the consumer market, primarily in mortgages for homes. But the regulations shifted, and they became allowed to invest more broadly. The assets of these small banks, of which there were thousands, were attractive in that they were a pool of cash available for investment. The S&Ls subsequently went into commercial real estate, sometimes with their old management, sometimes with new management who had bought them, as their depositors no longer held them. The infusion of money from the S&Ls drove up the price of commercial real estate, which the institutions regarded as stable and conservative investments, not unlike private homes. They did not take into account that their presence in the market was driving up the price of commercial real estate irrationally, however, or that commercial real estate prices fluctuate dramatically. As commercial real estate values started to fall, the assets of the S&Ls contracted until most failed. An entire sector of the financial system simply imploded, crushing shareholders and threatening a massive liquidity crisis. By the late 1980s, the entire sector had melted down, and in 1989 the federal government intervened. The federal government intervened in that crisis as it had in several crises large and small since 1929. Using the resources at its disposal, the federal government took over failed S&Ls and their real estate investments, creating the Resolution Trust Corp. (RTC). The amount of assets acquired was about $394 billion dollars in 1989 — or 6.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) — making it larger than the $700 billion dollars — or 5 percent of GDP — being discussed now. Rather than flooding the markets with foreclosed commercial property, creating havoc in the market and further destroying assets, the RTC held the commercial properties off the market, maintaining their price artificially. They then sold off the foreclosed properties in a multiyear sequence that recovered much of what had been spent acquiring the properties. More important, it prevented the decline in commercial real estate from accelerating and creating liquidity crises throug hout the entire economy. Many of those involved in S&Ls were ruined. Others managed to use the RTC system to recover real estate and to profit. Still others came in from the outside and used the RTC system to build fortunes. The RTC is not something to use as moral lesson for your children. But the RTC managed to prevent the transformation of a financial crisis into an economic meltdown. It disrupted market operations by introducing large amounts of federal money to bring liquidity to the system, then used the ability of the federal government — not shared by individuals — to hold on to properties. The disruption of the market’s normal operations was designed to avoid a market outcome. By holding on to the assets, the federal government was able to create an artificial market in real estate, one in which supply was constrained by the government to manage the value of commercial real estate. It did not work perfectly — far from it. But it managed to avoid the most feared outcome, which was a depression. There have been many other federal interventions in the markets, such as the bailout of Chrysler in the 1970s or the intervention into failed Third World bonds in the 1980s. Political interventions in the American (or global) marketplace are hardly novel. They are used to control the consequences of bad decisions in the marketplace. Though they introduce inefficiencies and frequently reward foolish decisions, they achieve a single end: limiting the economic consequences of these decisions on the economy as a whole. Good idea or not, these interventions are institutionalized in American economic life and culture. The ability of Americans to be shocked at the thought of bailouts is interesting, since they are not all that rare, as judged historically. The RTC showed the ability of federal resources — using taxpayer dollars — to control financial processes. In the end, the S&L story was simply one of bad decisions resulting in a shortage of dollars. On top of a vast economy, the U.S. government can mobilize large amounts of dollars as needed. It therefore can redefine the market for money. It did so in 1989 during the S&L crisis, and there was a general acceptance it would do so again Sept. 29. The RTC Model and the Road Ahead -As discussed above, the first group argues the current crisis is so large that it is beyond the federal government’s ability to redefine. More precisely, it would argue that the attempt at intervention would unleash other consequences — such as weakening dollars and inflation — meaning the cure would be worse than the disease. That may be the case this time, but it is difficult to see why the consequences of this bailout would be profoundly different from the RTC bailout — namely, a normal recession that would probably happen anyway. The debate between the political leadership and those opposing its plan is more interesting. The fundamental difference between the RTC and the current bailout was institutional. Congress created a semi-independent agency operating under guidelines to administer the S&L bailout. The proposal that was defeated Sept. 29 would have given the secretary of the Treasury extraordinary personal powers to dispense the money. Some also argued that the return on the federal investment was unclear, whereas in the RTC case it was fairly clear. In the end, all of this turned on the question of urgency. The establishment group argued that time was running out and the financial crisis was about to morph into an economic crisis. Those voting against the proposal argued there was enough time to have a more defined solution. There was obviously a more direct political dimension to all this. Elections are just more than a month a way, and the seat of every U.S. representative is in contest. The public is deeply distrustful of the establishment, and particularly of the idea that the people who caused the crisis might benefit from the bailout. The congressional opponents of the plan needed to demonstrate sensitivity to public opinion. Having done so, if they force a redefinition of the bailout plan, an additional 13 votes can likely be found to pass the measure. But the key issue is this: Are the resources of the United States sufficient to redefine financial markets in such a way as to manage the outcome of this crisis, or has the crisis become so large that even the resources of a $14 trillion economy mobilized by the state can’t do the job? If the latter is true, then all other discussions are irrelevant. Events will take their course, and nothing can be done. But if that is not true, that means that politics defines the crisis, as it has other crisis. In that case, the federal government can marshal the resources needed to redefine the markets and the key decision-makers are not on Wall Street, but in Washington. Thus, when the chips are down, the state trumps the markets. All of this may not be desirable, efficient or wise, but as an empirical fact, it is the way American society works and has worked for a long time. We are seeing a case study in it — including the possibility the state will refuse to act, creating an interesting and profound situation. This would allow the market alone to define the outcome of the crisis. This has not been allowed in extreme crises in 75 years, and we suspect this tradition of intervention will not be broken now. The federal government will act in due course, and an institutional resolution taking power from the Treasury and placing it in the equivalent of the RTC will emerge. The question is how much time remains before massive damage is done to the economy. Tell Stratfor What You Think
Tratado Mundial por la Paz
http://www.odemo.blogspot.com/ 1) La Paz es un Derecho irrenunciable y universal que debe garantizar todo Gobierno y Estado a sus ciudadanos de forma cooperativa, por ser una condición básica para la existencia y la preservación de la vida. La Paz debe ser oficialmente considerada como un Derecho Humano en un anexo de la Carta de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas y de la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos.
2) Para construir la Paz desde sus bases, los Estados y Gobiernos deben proceder de inmediato al desarme paulatino de la población civil en todo el mundo, decretando leyes nacionales que impongan penas de al menos diez (10) años por la tenencia de armas de fuego u otros mecanismos diseñados para dar muerte en manos de civiles.
3) Todo tema que pueda generar conflictos entre nacionales o entre nacionales y extranjeros, debe ser sometido a procesos libres y amplios de consulta y consenso popular entre los afectados, involucrados y colaboradores; apelando siempre al diálogo, la negociación y la resolución pacífica de controversias como forma exclusiva de dirimir las diferencias. En este sentido, siempre debe privar el criterio pacífico de los ciudadanos.
4) Se debe proceder a reducir paulatinamente el gasto en militar en todo el mundo, toda vez que creadas progresivamente las condiciones anteriores, se hace innecesario la existencia de enormes contingentes humanos, materiales y económicos dedicados a tales fines. La situación óptima que proponemos, es la eliminación por ley internacional de las Fuerzas de Guerra, contando en cada país con sólo fuerzas de prevención, resguardo y seguridad ciudadana.
5) La Guerra, el terrorismo y cualquier manifestación organizada de violencia, sea cual fuere su origen y expresión, serán consideradas violaciones a los Derechos Humanos y delitos de Lesa Humanidad. Por esa razón, sus promotores y auspiciantes serán acusados de atentar contra la vida en el planeta y la privación de su libertad deberá ser perpetua, por considerárseles un peligro permanente para la raza humana.
6) Se prohibirán específica e inmediatamente en el todo el mundo la fabricación de minas antipersonales, granadas, municiones explosivas y blindadas, lanza llamas, armas químicas, bacteriológicas y nucleares, así como cualquier otro instrumento o mecanismo que atente contra la vida de los civiles.

